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The British have succeeded in counter-insurgency where others have failed because history has given them the kind of military establishment and colonial administrative experience necessary to defeat revolutionary movements. Thomas R. Mockaitis 1 The British military has a well-earned reputation for success in counter-insurgency operations since 1945 gained through hard won experience. It has not been an easy path and there have been successes and failures, some of which are not well recorded or remembered. Since 1945 the British armed forces have taken part in 72 military campaigns. Of these campaigns, 17 can be classified as counter-insurgency campaigns (including Afghanistan and Iraq). 2 Breaking these 17 down even further, seven can claim to be successes, one is generally regarded as a draw, five are acknowledged failures, three are limited campaigns and difficult to quantify, and two are still in progress. 3 The fact is that a counter-insurgency campaign is one of the most difficult military operations to conduct and inevitably involves a long and painful path. In the numerous counter-insurgency campaigns that have been conducted by other nations since the end of the second world war, very few qualify as a complete success.
Measuring success in itself highlights one of the key problems in trying to assess counter-insurgency campaigns objectively. That the British can point to seven clear successes that are measurable suggests that the British approach to counterinsurgency is worthy of study. The British approach evolved through trial and error over 200 years of Imperial policing, revolutionary warfare and modern insurgencies around the globe. Nevertheless, the development of counter-insurgency techniques and doctrine has not always followed a coherent or planned path. It is only since 1945 that the British have started to capture their experience effectively in doctrine and this means that much has been ignored from the 150 years prior to this date.
Unfortunately, a number of popular myths have developed around the British approach based largely on what many consider to be the exemplar of the Malayan
Campaign. This has led to the questionable advocacy in some quarters that British doctrine is the best model and that the British military is best able to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign. The current British counter-insurgency doctrine does provide a very sound basis from which to develop a counter-insurgency campaign but it is, as the document states, only a guideline. It is true that the British Armed forces are well placed to fight a counter-insurgency campaign based on collective experience and mentality, but there is a danger of complacency in accepting that as the "experts" and the ones with the highest success rate, the British doctrine is complete and needs little or no modification. This is a dangerous assumption in a rapidly changing world. 4 The aim of this paper is to produce a balanced and fair assessment of the total British experience in counter-insurgency and to distill a theory that may help counter the strategic challenges of the future. This paper outlines the future strategic environment and answers three questions: What is the British approach and how did it develop?
What are the myths and realities about the development of this approach? Can a coherent theory be developed from the British experience that can tackle the strategic challenges of the future?
The Future
The key strategic challenge of the future is the nature of the threat. At the start of the twenty-first century the physical nature of war-violence, destruction and chaos-has changed little, but the international system has changed significantly.
Communications and technology have changed the face, pace and destructive power of war. States and nation states are still the key players within the system, but the number and nature of non-state actors has increased, including more rogue elements. As civilization rises to the next level of its evolution, there is more discontent within and between existing and emerging political structures. Strong ideologies are taking hold in some areas of the world, particularly in the Islamic world which is facing both an identity crisis and an internal ideological struggle to define its position within twenty-first century civilization. General Sir Rupert Smith argues that future wars will be about war among the people, where the battlefield will not easily be defined, and we will see less state on state war and more internal to the state (intra-state) conflict and terrorism. 5 The current world situation gives considerable credence to this viewpoint but, as Colin Gray contends, this does not rule out state on state war and there is every likelihood that it will continue. 6 What form will insurgency take in the future? Are we facing a global insurgency?
Assuming that the international world order will still be based on some form of state-centric system, the role of insurgency as a vehicle for political change is likely to remain. Intra-state insurgency will be common and external interventions may increase depending on the threat to international stability and economic prosperity perceived at the time by the world community.
To complicate the issue, there are a plethora of highly unhelpful terms in current use which obfuscate true understanding of the nature of an insurgent war. This leads neatly to the changing nature of insurgency in the twenty-first century. Britain's experience of counter-insurgency prior to 1998 was very much defined by the fact that
Britain was the legitimate power in its former colonies or was asked to intervene through a formal treaty, friendship or informal alliance. The enemy was easily identifiable and there was often only one major enemy combatant (i.e., the communist terrorists in Malaya and the Mau, Mau in Kenya). In the twenty-first century there are insurgent groups trying to foment global insurgency where insurgencies in different parts of the globe mutually support each other to change the world order or to achieve their own independent goals, but which also serve their allies' objectives. The idea of a global insurgency has not really been defined and this is an important challenge. A first attempt to do so is offered here:
Coordinated simultaneous conflicts involving state and non-state actors, using both regular and irregular methods at multiple locations world wide, based on either a single coherent vision for the new order or mutually supporting objectives that assist the participating groups towards their own goals, usually with little regard for national boundaries.
The existence of a global insurgency implies a certain unity of purpose among the different groups, common campaign enablers (such as information technology, logistics, safe havens and military resources) and the possibility of achieving mass popular support. This is much more difficult to achieve than it sounds on paper but Al Qaeda is trying to initiate a global Islamic insurgency to reinstate the Islamic Caliphate using a network of Islamic terror and insurgent groups. A true global insurgency is even more complex with the possibility of a "marriage of convenience" taking place between groups with different ideologies for specific objectives. This is not new. For example, the strong links forged between the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque Separatist Movement (ETA) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1970s created an international terrorist cabal, but the scope of cooperation and the ease of communications have changed the scale of the dynamics of such a relationship today.
These changes in the future operating environment are the threat against which the current British approach to counter-insurgency must be measured to determine its continued applicability.
The British Approach to Counter-Insurgency
The current British national approach is foremost a multi-agency approach starting with clear national interests and political direction even before analysis and preparation.
It is also fair to say that, although the British military is inherently joint in its focus, the expertise associated with British counter-insurgency is largely Army-centric. This is not surprising as counter-insurgency is about interaction between people and, generally, territorially focused, although this latter point is being challenged with the possible advent of a global insurgency facilitated through cyberspace.
The national level approach recognizes that the military is only one part of the overall solution, and it acknowledges that a wide range of instruments of power and methods need to be applied in conducting an effective campaign. The baseline document is the British Army counter-insurgency manual, Army Field Manual (AFM) Volume 1, Combined Part 10. 7 The manual is organised in two distinct but interrelated parts: the first part defines insurgency and gives an excellent overview of insurgency from a limited historical and theoretical perspective. Part 2 concerns the methodology for conducting a counter-insurgency campaign. The manual is purposely laid out in this way to highlight the two protagonist viewpoints of insurgency.
Key to the British approach in the manual is understanding both the mind of the enemy and Britain's own strengths and weaknesses in order to effectively use the latter against the insurgent. The manual defines insurgency as:
The actions of a minority group within a state, who are intent on forcing political change by a means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of the people to accept such a change. It is an organised, armed political struggle, the goals of which might be diverse.
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The key ideas from this definition are that the insurgents are dissatisfied with the state or ruling power and they want ideological change and political reform. Thus insurgencies are inherently political and their objectives are to de-legitimize the existing government and seize political power. Insurgents aim to target the broad mass of the people to make them agree with their point of view, pushing for change by persuasion, coercion, intimidation or the application force. They will use propaganda, subversion, sabotage and direct military action in an organised way and it is this dedication to clear objectives and organization that differentiates insurgents from terrorists, even though insurgents often use terrorism themselves at the tactical level. 9 The AFM argues that because of the insurgents' focus on the population as the centre of gravity, both the insurgent and counter-insurgency forces are in a struggle to win the "hearts and minds"
of the target population.
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In British Army doctrine the role of counter-insurgency operations is to alter the views of those who insurgency appeals to, protect those that it targets for change and reinforce the legitimacy of the supported government. The AFM definition of counterinsurgency is: those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency. 11 It is a simple definition, but one which recognizes As Thomas Mockaitis correctly points out, a coherent British approach only really came into being as a result of the lessons of the Malayan Emergency. 17 Even then it was not until 1966 (Thompson) and 1971 (Kitson) that the two most experienced and best know practitioners were able to commit the lessons of their experiences to paper.
Consequently, current British doctrine is founded in only a near-term evaluation of
British experience and, to some degree, its reputation is founded more on myth than the true facts behind the actual historical experience. In effect, lessons have been cherrypicked from the near-past without understanding the true context.
Myths
What are the myths that are inherent to the current British approach? The first myth is that the British approach to counter-insurgency is a result of a correct interpretation of experience to doctrine over time. The implication from this is that the British have become better at counter-insurgency with each campaign. This is clearly a fallacy as the passage of this knowledge was not always seamless even in modern times and the results have been correspondingly variable throughout Britain's history.
As an example, the Malayan (1948 Malayan ( -1960 and Kenyan (1952 Kenyan ( -1956 a costly two year guerilla campaign in South Africa. 19 The fact is that each campaign must be planned and conducted differently to match unique conditions.
The second myth is that the British approach is best. The British have developed a very effective approach that is worthy of study but there are other approaches that have equally valid lessons. The French, in particular, fought colonial campaigns during the same period as the British withdrawal from empire. While they enjoyed fewer political and military successes, they produced some of the earliest and most influential counter-insurgency theory, proving somewhat the adage that defeated armies learn while the victors continue to prepare for the last war. The works of Roger Trinquier and
David Galula are of particular note. Hence, it is important to keep an open mind when considering how to deal with an insurgency. 20 In developing theory and doctrine, it is essential to study the theory and doctrine of others in order to identify principles that may be applicable to all counter-insurgency campaigns. The real lesson is that doctrine should be an application of valid theory to actual circumstances and theory is valid only as long as it accounts for the phenomenon of the insurgency.
The third myth is that the Malayan Emergency is the counter-insurgency exemplar.
The Malayan Campaign (1948-1960) was a significant success but it was a unique event. There are some very relevant and enduring lessons in terms of understanding the nature of insurgency, the application of the multi-agency approach and specific tactical techniques and procedures but, to be relevant, it must be put in context. Malaya was successful in large part because of its geo-strategic location with only one border with Thailand and a secure base in Singapore from which to operate. It could be isolated and sanctuaries more easily addressed. The jungle environment, although difficult, was mastered by the British Army, particularly the Gurkha Battalions, because some of the units had recent experience operating in the jungle from the Burma campaign and it was able to apply their knowledge. 21 Separating the insurgents from the population was a long process, but the British had a significant advantage in that the insurgents were non-indigenous and had minimal internal and external support. 22 In addition the British forces had recently learned valuable lessons from their mistakes in Palestine, particularly in terms of the requirement for an effective police force and the importance of a coordinated "hearts and minds" campaign, which enabled them to interact with the general population effectively. Internationally, the Malayan campaign was largely over-shadowed by other world events. The Chinese Communists under Mao Tse Tung were still consolidating internally after victory over the Nationalist Chinese and provided no support to the Malayan Communists.
Perhaps of greater importance, the British recognized that Malaya was on an unstoppable path to independence and it made no sense to hinder this process. Britain effectively undermined the Malaysian Communist Party by setting a clear political objective to grant Malaya independence by 1957. 23 In terms of direction, the Briggs
Plan for Malaya was a masterpiece but it took the personality of Field Marshal Sir
Gerald Templer to turn it into reality. Furthermore, Templer had the benefit of plenipotentiary powers to execute his mission. 24 He was both High Commissioner of Malaya and Commander-in Chief. Finally, the usual British problem of lack of resources was offset by the fact that the Malayan economy was growing in prosperity and Malaya paid most of the bills. It should also be remembered that, until the Aden campaign, there was very little media coverage of British operations and this allowed a degree of operational freedom that does not exist today. Thus Malaya was a unique set of circumstances which will not be likely repeated again. The concern, unfortunately, is that these unique circumstances have been used to drive how theory is derived and suggest particular doctrines that may or may not be generally applicable. Many of the lessons from Malaya are still useful, but not all of them and the context of how they were extracted needs to be considered.
The fourth myth is what is meant by the term "hearts and minds." The British have gained an excellent reputation for "hearts and minds" but this phrase is over-used and often misunderstood. "Hearts and minds" is often mistaken to mean taking a soft approach when dealing with the civilian population, but this is a misnomer. The key is changing the mindset of the target audience and, sometimes, this requires tough measures and a hard approach i.e., mass movement of the population, curfews and direct military action (riot control). As the mindset is being changed, small acts of support (i.e., medical and veterinary support) and the way in which government security forces interact with the population, combined with an effective information operations campaign, wins over their hearts. As Thomas Mockaitis implies, the phrase really should be "minds and hearts." 25 The fifth myth is the use of minimum force. Minimum force is what is appropriate for the situation and this can range from martial law to conventional warfighting in a counter-insurgency context. Jackson and Mockaitis point out some fairly brutal acts by British forces by today's standards which enabled them to achieve certain objectives.
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Particular examples include rough interrogations, internment without trial and different rules of engagement for different ethnic populations. 27 Such methodologies cannot be condoned today but they were a significant factor in the conduct of British campaigns.
Generally, however, Jackson and Mockaitis accede that the British have consciously tried to work within the law and used the minimum amount of force necessary since the late Victorian period. What constitutes minimal force is determined by tactical circumstances and the strategic objectives, and will not necessarily be the lowest force option.
The sixth myth is that the British Army has won Britain's counter-insurgency campaigns. The British Army has been a significant factor in Britain's success but, as British India . 30 John Nagl partly supports this view but correctly surmises that the real roots of the development of the current approach started well before this in the nineteenth century. 31 Indeed, the evidence clearly shows that it is the rich experience in the combination of the need to police the empire and the varied challenges that this involved which gave the British military a head start and a unique way to understanding how to deal with the problem of insurgency in the 20 th century. It is in the development of the British Army in the particular arenas of imperial politics and limited military operations that has given it the special character that it has today and its lauded suitability for counter-insurgency operations.
Throughout the history of the British Empire Great Britain's national interests can be defined as:
• The protection of free trade.
• Being seen as a great world power.
• The cohesion and security of the Empire (and particularly British India).
• The security of the British Homeland.
• The promotion of civilization and Christianity.
British strategy was therefore about physical and economic security through global leadership, a preferred trading posture, a strong navy and a minimal army, all of which enabled Britain to maintain its position in the world. It sought to avoid major wars unless the homeland was directly threatened, or a significant threat arose to Britain's imperial possessions. As a sovereign and imperial power, Britain required armed forces that were capable of defending the homeland and of conducting expeditionary operations to protect the empire. Front. That the empire survived until the second half of the twentieth century and through and after two world wars, albeit shakily, is testimony to the success of this imperial approach.
The British fought over 230 campaigns in the Victorian era alone. 35 Some of these were limited wars in terms of objectives and the use of force. Others were unlimited, particularly those aiming to end a nationalist uprising. Guerilla warfare was a fact of life in many areas such as the North West frontier of India. Insurgency is a twentieth century term but many of these earlier campaigns would now be labeled insurgencies.
It was the imperial era which gave the British Army its unique character and this heyday of Empire produced some valuable lessons which have since evolved into modern counter-insurgency principles and doctrine. The first and foremost lesson is the principle of civilian control of the military. The primacy of civilian control was generally maintained throughout the imperial period and remains a very important factor in the conduct of British counter-insurgency campaigns. Even at the height of empire when British military commanders had almost regional/colonial plenipotentiary powers, they always served subordinate to the local civilian authority and acted on his behalf unless a state of emergency existed. In cases where the military took charge ". . . the imperial general was also a proconsul, forced to rely on his political skills as much as his operational expertise to prevail." 36 He had to look at all the problems from the point of view of his political masters, not just apply a military perspective.
The second lesson that emerges from this era is the need for pragmatism. Spread over long lines of communication with limited resources, the British military has always had to rely on local support and be thoroughly innovative in the way that it conducts operations. It has had to be culturally aware and has often failed where it has not been.
British forces have had no other option than to be pragmatic when analyzing and addressing military and political issues around the world, leading to some innovative solutions and, generally, better cultural astuteness.
The third lesson from the Imperial experience is the value of the organizational knowledge inherent in a regimental system. The strength of the system is that lessons The first premise is that insurgency is war. War is a political act that requires an active decision to initiate it and a clear declaration of intent. 37 It is generally regarded as being between one or more actors within the international system which includes state actors or actors within a state. Therefore, by inference, war can be both external (between states) and internal (civil war and insurgency), or a mix of both. Hence, war is a political act, it uses violence, it is both offensive and defensive in nature, and can be either internal or external to the state. An insurgency is internal to the state even though the key players may be prosecuting their campaign from a safe haven outside with external support. There should be no confusion: an insurgency is a war.
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The second premise is that every campaign is unique and the nature of the conflict must be understood. It takes time to fully understand the nature of the problem faced and to develop the lines of operation to deal with it. While broad general counterinsurgency principles may translate well across campaigns, one size does not fit all.
The geography, history, culture, ideology and ethnicity of a country will all affect how the campaign should be conducted. As Clausewitz so brilliantly explains: "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking;
neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." The third first premise is envisioning the long-term post-conflict end-state. As Sir Basil Liddell Hart wrote: "The object of the counter-insurgency war is to attain a better peace -even if only from your point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire." 40 In what is a struggle over who has the best and most achievable vision for the future, the object of the war is to achieve a better peace by compelling others to willingly accede to new conditions that define peace on terms acceptable to you. The quality of the peace will only be decided by the perception of the legitimacy of the strategy followed by engaging sufficient resources to The sixth premise is the requirement for a clear plan. This is one of Sir Robert
Thompson's five principles and is based on his experience in helping to formulate the Briggs Plan. 41 It is an essential factor for success. The plan must, however, be tailored to the peculiar and unique circumstances of the insurgency. Plans should provide a focus for all of the involved agencies that is universally understood and accepted. Plans must clearly link to the long term objective of an enduring peace. An excellent example of an effective plan is the British Five Front Plan for the Dhofar campaign. 42 The particular situation of Dhofar as an underdeveloped region of Oman meant that it needed economic development. The campaign end-state was therefore to secure Dhofar for development and the five fronts to achieve this were:
1. To clearly identify the enemy and friendly forces by establishing an effective intelligence collection and collation system.
2. To communicate clear intent to the insurgents, the population, and the government agencies and forces.
3. To provide security by helping the Dhofaris to protect their own province by involving them in the overall provision of security.
4. To provide medical aid to the people of Dhofar in a region that had none.
5. To provide veterinary services for the cattle in the Dhofar region which are the main source of wealth.
This plan indicates an excellent understanding of the needs of the people of Dhofar set against the context of the campaign and the need to win "hearts and minds" to ensure an enduring peace. It can be easily followed and provides latitude to individual commanders as well as guidelines on how to operate. Finally, in terms of communication, it is accessible to all agencies and simple to understand. The message is unambiguous to all audiences -local, international and domestic.
The seventh premise is that there is always a learning stage at the beginning of each campaign and that it is vitally important to learn from mistakes quickly. It takes time to understand the nature of each campaign and, in the process of doing so, it is inevitable that some mistakes will be made. It is important that the potential for mistakes is minimized by a thorough assessment of the situation before deployment and a willingness to learn quickly and then adapt to the new circumstances. Once the campaign has started the effectiveness of the method of operating must be constantly re-assessed to enable the government and security forces to be responsive to the population and remain one step ahead of the insurgents, keeping them on the defensive. The Boyd OODA loop of observe, orientate, decide and act remains the best model for describing this process. Republicans. 44 It is often forgotten that the Malayan Emergency did not start well. The initial approach to the insurgency was not dynamic and a number of mistakes were made before the British realized the seriousness of the threat. 45 It was really only after the assassination of the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, on 6 th October 1951
that Britain started to react to the situation effectively and activated the Briggs Plan. 46 In Kenya, the first year of the campaign was the bloodiest when the British let the indigenous kikuyu-led Police conduct many of the operations without appropriate supervision. 47 The campaign was very nearly lost but the British forces learned quickly enough to reverse the process and achieve eventual success. The learning stage suggests that it is better to start with small measured steps until the full nature of the situation faced is apparent and then make use of what has been learned to gain the advantage.
The eighth premise is that politics is the focal point. is not enough just to know ourselves; we must also know our adversary and what it is that has shaped them. answer is yes to both counts. In the case of the model, the single football match becomes a tournament. Rather than tackle all of the games at once, they have to be tackled in the appropriate sequence and never more that two or three at a time. The lessons from the British approach and experience are still valid, but they must be applied intelligently to each new situation.
The tenth premise is that the requirement for a coordinated multi-agency government approach is paramount to success. This is true for governments externally intervening and for existing internal governments. The overall strategy and ensuing plans must be collaborative and involve multi-agencies and actors using all of the elements of national power of both the supported and supporting governments. In doing this the activities have to be coordinated and synchronized so that they work together and not against one another. For example, security and economic development must go hand in hand so that security yields an economic dividend and development is not just providing another opportunity for a target. This has been one of the key enduring tenets of the British approach and a cornerstone of every successful campaign. The best known examples are in Malaya and Northern Ireland.
The eleventh premise is that it is essential to work within the rule of law. Rule of law is the visible symbol of moral justification. The aim must be to restore the civilian authority and police primacy if it does not already exist. Where it does not exist, the military must shoulder the burden until such time as the relevant civilian and police capabilities can be trained to fulfil their role. Regardless of who has the lead at a particular time, the rule of law must be both understood and demonstrated, in the existing circumstances, to be meaningful and fair to the local population in order to reinforce the legitimacy of the counter-insurgents. This is an existing principle of Sir Robert Thompson's theory. 52 The twelfth premise is that counter-insurgents must only use the appropriate force necessary for the situation faced. The appropriate use of force is the minimum amount of force required to achieve a particular legitimate objective. This can range from full scale warfighting against an insurgent base deep in the jungle to the single arrest of an insurgent in an urban area. The British military has relied heavily on flexible Rules of Engagement (ROE) to ensure that only the minimum force necessary is used for each situation. Force must be proportionate and justified and the intent to use force clearly understood. In the British Army, operations in Northern Ireland have proved this premise again, demonstrating that junior commanders can be empowered to make tough decisions when they are needed.
The thirteenth premise is that campaigns must be appropriately resourced to be truly effective. Like all conflicts where fighting is likely, counter-insurgency campaigns are expensive in term of "blood and treasure." It is, however, the "treasure" element of this equation that is often the most lacking in counter-insurgency campaigns. Such campaigns are often the most expensive to conduct and they generally take longer than conventional warfighting campaigns to conclude. There is, however, a balance to be struck between resources and ingenuity. Too many physical resources can be problematic and worsen the situation by limiting innovation and confusing peripheral material matters with the real issues of minds and hearts. Counter-insurgency is manpower intensive over a potentially long period of time and this needs to be considered during the early analysis of the problem. 53 However, the real resources issue is nearly always a lack of funds for the non-military support to the campaign which is a critical factor in winning minds and hearts. The appropriate and realistic level of resources must be envisioned and allocated before the counter-insurgency campaign starts.
The fourteenth premise is that accurate and timely information and intelligence are essential to success. Insurgency and counter-insurgency both work in the same strategic environment and the currency is intelligence that can be used to act.
Conventional military campaigns also require intelligence, but the level and detail of information required is much greater in counter-insurgency. A counter-insurgency campaign must win the battle for information. This is a key element in General Sir Frank Kitson's theory. 54 The fifteenth premise is that the use of indigenous forces is essential to building a an enduring peace for the country concerned. In all British campaigns local indigenous forces have played an important role. They have acted as the backbone of intelligence gathering, police forces and the local military. The importance of their use is threefold:
first, it involves them in the long term solution in that they represent the population and therefore provide some censure over civil control; second, it enables the security forces to understand the nature of the conflict that they are involved in; and third, once trained and well led, they are generally more effective in their environment.
The sixteenth premise is that every new campaign will face increasing constraints and less freedom in the conduct of operations. The world of the twenty-first century is very different from fifty years ago. The Malayan campaign and Kenya were fought largely out of the glare of the media whereas Iraq and Afghanistan have twenty-four hour news coverage. Conflicts in the nineteenth century were reported weeks later. If history is our guide, this will only become worse and is a significant factor when considering undertaking a counter-insurgency or conducting a counter-insurgency campaign. Other significant restricting factors include the progress in human rights, the evolution of international law and the advent of immediate worldwide communications.
The lesson to take from this is not to uselessly fight the march of progress, but to formulate a clear strategy that works with and around the identified constraints-or better yet, exploits them-in order to achieve some operational freedoms.
Conclusions
The British approach to counter-insurgency is worthy of attention. It is not the only approach, but it is one which is notable for its successes. Yet, the British approach has emerged in an iterative and often disjointed way. The current approach has developed largely from experience post-1945, creating some myths and ignoring some lessons from earlier periods. The operating principles and techniques with their origins in the earlier colonial era and their broader implications have tended to be ignored. Hence, the study of the whole of Great Britain's colonial and post-colonial counter-insurgency experience is more relevant and yields additional lessons that are applicable to modern counter-insurgencies. A more thorough study of the development of the British approach has resulted in a number of clearer realties which have been developed in this
paper. This closer examination of the whole of the British experience yields 16 premises that, taken together, constitute a theory that outlines how success can be pursued and when success may no longer be possible. The key to the utility of these premises is understanding that counter-insurgency is, in fact, war.
